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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Anthony Ortega appeals, asserting that the district court

by allowing the

testimony of his son's maternal grandmother, Tina Curtis, her significant other, Byron
Stewart, and his son's maternal great grandmother, Carma Pirrong, since their
testimony constituted only propensity evidence. Furthermore, he asserted that, since
his defense was that he did not touch his son as the indictment alleged, the identified
testimony was not relevant to show absence of mistake or accident. His defense did
not put intent sufficiently at issue in that regard.
district court erred by not giving

requested "reasonable parenting efforts" instruction,

is an accurate statement of the law
supports the theory of

Mr. Ortega also contended that the

a reasonable view of the evidence

the instruction

As a result of these two errors, this Court should vacate the judgment of
conviction in this case, and also reverse the district court's decisions to allow the
propensity evidence and to not give the requested instruction, and remand this case for
a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Ortega's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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1.

Whether the district court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of prior
that were irrelevant to any legitimate issues.
Whether the district court erred by not giving the requested jury instruction on
reasonable parenting efforts.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence Of Prior Bad Acts
That Were Irrelevant To Any Legitimate Issues

A.

The Testimony Improperly Admitted Pursuant To Rule 404(8) Was Properly
Identified For Purposes Of This Appeal
The State makes several arguments in regard to the district court's decision to

admit the propensity evidence in this case; none are persuasive. First, it contends that
Mr. Ortega did not identify, with sufficient specificity, the testimony which should have
been excluded.

It cites no authority for this proposition, and so

should be rejected. See LA.R. 35(b)(6); Cf., State v. Zichko, 1

unsupported
Idaho

(1
Alternatively, if this Court is going to adopt the State's proposed rule requiring
specific identification of the evidence challenged on appeal, that rule has be applied
with equal force to both the defense and the prosecution, or else the rule violates the
defendant's right to due process.

See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472

(1972) (holding the failure to

adopt reciprocal

rules violates the

Fourteenth

Amendment's promise of due process). Applying the State's proposed rule of specificity
to this case demonstrates error because the State did not identify all the propensity
evidence it subsequently elicited at trial with sufficient specificity in the appropriate
notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence.

As the rule requires the proponent of such

evidence to "file and serve notice," the verbal notice given in this case does not
sufficiently identify the propensity evidence to be used. !.R.E. 404(b). In fact, the only
evidence the State did specifically identify in the proper notice was the testimony from
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Byron

regarding Mr.
,pp.71

purported grabbing and yanking of A.O.'s arm.

) Therefore, applying the State's proposed rule of specificity with

equal force, as required by due process, the testimony from Mr. Stewart, Ms. Curtis,
and Ms. Pirrong, which was not properly and specifically identified in the State's 404(b)
notice, was improperly admitted.

State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2007)

(holding that compliance with 404(b)'s notice requirement is mandatory and if the State
fails to comply with it, the evidence is inadmissible).

As such, the judgment of

conviction should be reversed because, under the State's proposed rule of specificity,
the propensity evidence was improperly admitted. Altematively, applying such a rule
without

effect means that Mr. Ortega

process rights, which would constitute a separate

have been deprived of his due
for relief.

Regardless, the specific testimony challenged was identified in Mr. Ortega's
motion to reconsider. (See R., pp.B7-B9.) Defense counsel asserted it was challenging
testimony from Byron Stewart regarding the incident where Mr. Ortega was purportedly
"rough with Mr. Ortega's son's arm" and "similar testimony from other witnesses
regarding Defendant's behavior with Defendant's son." (R., p.87.) He also specifically
identified testimony "regarding Mr. Ortega's discipline toward his son allegedly
witnessed by his son's maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandmother."
(R. p.88.) Mr. Ortega requested an order "barring this type of testimony at his trial."
(R., p.88.) Furthermore, by contending that these witnesses could offer no testimony
relevant to the event for which Mr. Ortega had been charged, Mr. Ortega identified the
entirety of the three witness's testimony as the evidence he considered to be erroneous.
(See, e.g., R., pp.87-88.) Although, on appeal, he grouped all that testimony together
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as

testimony "dealing with Mr. Ortega's parenting techniques," Mr. Ortega continued

to argue that

the testimony identified in the pretrial motions was improperly admitted.

e.g., App. Br., pp.9-10.) Therefore, the State's argument that the evidence being

addressed has not been specifically identified is meritless.

B.

The Doctrine Of Invited Error Is Not Applicable Because Of The Adverse Pretrial
Ruling On The Admissibility Of Such Evidence
The State argues, in regard to the testimony from Mr. Stewart regarding the

incident where Mr. Ortega purportedly grabbed and yanked on A.O.'s arm, Mr. Ortega
should be prohibited from challenging its admission based on the principle of invited
error because it was his attorney who ultimately
, pp.9-10.)

State's argument is erroneous

that testimony.

(Resp.

the record reveals that

this line of questioning was related to questions asked by the prosecution during direct
examination. (Compare Tr., Vo1.2, p.187, L.18 - p.188, L.1 (Mr. Stewart's testimony on
direct examination talking about H[t]he second time that I took -- I asked him [Mr. Ortega]
to come outside and to talk with me .... "); with Tr., Vo1.2, p.194, LS.3-4 (Mr. Stewart's
testimony on cross examination talking about "the second conversation that we
[Mr. Ortega and Mr. Stewart] had").) Therefore, since the questions were in response to
testimony elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination, the State's invited error
doctrine is wholly improper.
Furthermore, the State's argument constitutes an over-broad application of the
invited error doctrine, since it was initially the State that requested the admission of
such testimony and Mr. Ortega properly objected to its admission. It was only after the
district court's adverse ruling on that point that defense counsel inquired in this regard,

5

which merely constitutes his effort to make the best of the district court's erroneous
adverse ruling on that point In such

counsel's reasonable efforts to defend his

client in light of the adverse ruling do not forfeit a challenge to the adverse ruling itself
on appeal.
In Idaho, the invited error doctrine applies to estop a party receiving relief for an
error on appeal when that party's own actions encouraged or prompted the trial court to
make the erroneous ruling.
State

Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 823, 833 (2010);

v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838 (1983).

However, where the party did not

encourage the error, he is not estopped from challenging that error on appeal by the
invited error doctrine.

v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 449 (2010). In fact, the invited

error does not apply if the defense merely

to object to an error,

the failure

to object cannot be qualified as encouraging the erroneous ruling. /d. Even when the
defendant moves for relief and the district court grants a form of relief, if "the specific
relief [the defendant] sought is not what was granted by the district court," an appellate
challenge to that decision is not barred by the invited error doctrine. State v. Edghifl,
155 Idaho 846, 849-50 (Ct. App. 2014).
In this case, Mr. Ortega contended that Mr. Stewart's testimony should not be
admitted. (See, e.g., R, pp.87-89.) Therefore, he cannot have been said to encourage
the district court's ruling that it was admissible. As such, the invited error doctrine does
not prevent his challenge to that decision on appeal.
Edghilf, 155 Idaho at 849-50.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 449;

As several other state courts have observed, '''[a]n

attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making
appropriate objections or motions does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in
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accordance therewith and endeavoring to make the best of a bad situation for which he
was not responsible.",1

Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Cal.

1991), en banc; People v. Calio,

P.2d 1162, 1164 (Cal. 1986), en banc (quoting

Leibman v. Curtis, 291 P.2d 542, 544 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)); IIVilson v. IHe
Hospitals, Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 390 n.20 (Utah 2012) (quoting Mary M., 814 P.2d at

1346)).
In this case, defense counsel pursued this line of questioning to elicit testimony
that Mr. Stewart had threatened Mr. Ortega after the incident where Mr. Ortega was
alleged to have grabbed and yanked A.O.'s arm. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.193, L.25 - p.194, LA.)
Mr. Stewart testified that was

to an incident he mentioned on direct examination,

where he talked with Mr. Ortega about the need to be appropriate in his disciplining of
A.O. (Tr., Vol

p.194, LS.3-4 (Mr. Stewart's testimony on cross); compare Tr., Vo1.2,

p.187, L.18 - p.188, L.1 (Mr. Stewart's testimony on direct).) As such, Mr. Ortega's
attorney proceeded to make inquiries relevant to the defense's case, which actually
related to testimony offered on direct examination, following an adverse ruling to which

1 The holdings in Adamcik and Edghill suggest that Idaho's appellate courts view the
invited error doctrine in a similar light. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has
considered a similar, yet distinct, factual scenario to this, and found that invited error
prevented the appellate challenge. See State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 225 (1985). In
that case, defense counsel, on direct examination, elicited testimony that should not
have been admissible under the hearsay rules regarding co-conspirator statements. Id.
It does not appear that there was a pretrial motion discussing the admissibility of such
testimony. See generally id. However, in this case, where defense counsel made the
appropriate objections, and the district court had already ruled against Mr. Ortega
regarding the admissibility of that evidence, Caudill is distinguishable. Indeed, to hold to
the contrary in this case would force defense attorneys to essentially abandon their
client's defense once an erroneous, adverse pretrial ruling was entered in order to
preserve an appellate challenge to that erroneous decision. Such a result is untenable.
As such, to the extent it has not already done so in Adamcik and Edghill, Idaho should
adopt the logically-sound limitation on invited error articulated in Mary M.
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Mr.

had objected. Therefore, Mr. Ortega can hardly be said to have encouraged

the district court to find this evidence admissible or to initially present it to the jury.
Adamcik, 1

Idaho at 449. Thus, the doctrine of invited error does not bar

Mr. Ortega's argument against that ruling and testimony on appeal.

C.

Since Mr. Ortega's Defense Was That He Did !\Jot Grab AO.'s Arm, His Intent
Was !\Jot Sufficiently At Issue, And Therefore, The Admission Of This Propensity
Evidence Was !\Jot Justified As Evidence Of Absence Of Mistake Or Accident
The State argues that, pursuant to State v. Hassett, 124 Idaho 357, 361-62

(Ct. App. 1993), the testimony from Mr. Stewart, Ms. Curtis, and Ms. Pirrong was
to show that AO.'s injuries were not accidentally received.

(Resp.

10-11.) The State's argument demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
of accident or mistake" justification to allow propensity

That

justification allows propensity evidence to rebut a claim that the defendant did the
alleged act, but did so by accident or mistake; it does not allow such evidence to rebut a
claim that the injuries were received independent of any touching at all.

See, e.g.,

State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 219-20 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973,
974-75 (Ct. App. 1985).
The State's argument ignores this critical distinction. In Hassett, the defense was
that the defendant "intended to twist the child's leg and squeeze his chest, but only for
examination and resuscitation purposes." Hassett, 124 Idaho at 361 (emphasis added).
Mr. Ortega, on the other hand, did not admit to the alleged touching AO. in the alleged
manner. For example, he asserted that he did not touch AO.'s arm when it broke, but
rather, asserted that AO. had fallen out of the car and landed on his arm, causing it to
break.

(See Tr., Vo1.2, p.i07, LS.6-8 (defense counsel telling the jury: "Why we are
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is we have a fundamental disagreement on how those [injuries] got there");
p.496, L.21 - p.497, L8 (defense counsel arguing to the jury that, on the 911
recording, "[Mr. Ortega's] voice and his tone is not that of someone who is frustrated
and has snapped at his kid, but somebody who is legitimately concemed about their
child being hurt .... That's not the kind of reaction of somebody who just abused their
child and caused a spiral fracture is going to display").) That is a critical difference

the

defendant in Hassett admitted to the alleged touching (twisting the leg, squeezing the
chest), whereas Mr. Ortega did not admit to the alleged touching. 2 Because Mr. Ortega
did

admit the alleged touching, but rather argued that it did not happen, Hassett is

distinguishable this case.
case is governed by Roach.
considered this

In Roach, the

of Appeals

same factual distinction, and even highlighted the critical analysis

applicable in such situations:
Roach's defense was that he did not commit the act. He does not, as well
he could not, contend that he committed the act with innocent intent. ...
Roach never contended that he committed the acts but with innocent
intent or mental defect, nor did he have an alibi defense. We do not

The indictment alleges that Mr. Ortega caused injuries to A.O.'s arm (Count I), and to
his buttocks, abdomen, and chest (Count II). (R., pp.22-23.) And while Mr. Ortega did
admit some limited physical disciplining of A.O., he did not admit to committing the
crimes charged or inflicting injuries similar to those identified in the indictment.
Therefore, since Mr. Ortega did not admit the alleged touching, the propensity evidence
is not relevant to refute a defense of accidental or mistaken touching.
Even if this Court finds that the propensity evidence was relevant to one of the
two charges, the fact that there was no limiting instruction to that effect still means that
this case needs to be remanded for a new trial. Additionally, as will be discussed in
depth in Section II, the reasonable parenting instruction is relevant to such arguments,
and so its absence further demonstrates that this case needs to be remanded, even if
this Court determines that the propensity evidence is partially relevant to the offenses
charged.
2
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believe that intent was sufficiently at issue to allow the questioned
evidence as probative of intent.
Roach, 109 Idaho

975. Idaho's

distinction and used the implied rule

courts have continuously recognized this
that propensity evidence is only relevant under

absence of mistake to contest a defense that admits the action, but claims it was done
accidentally or mistakenly

~

to resolve similar cases. See, e.g., State v. Cardell, 132

Idaho 217, 220 (1998) (finding that, because the defendant admitted to giving the victim
a massage, propensity evidence was relevant to the issue of whether the alleged lewd
touching of the victim during that
Idaho 339,

v0C'L!C>

was accidental); State v. Brummett, 150

(Ct. App. 2010) (distinguishing Roach because the defendant's

"because Brummett admitted to the
steal] was squarely at issue"

UG'ACIU

theft" and because
his defense to

intent [to

burglary charge was that he

entered the store without the intent to steal); State v. McGuire, 135 Idaho 535, 538
(Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the defendant had put his intent at issue by forwarding the
defense that he had touched the victim, but did so without lewd intent and, therefore,
the propensity evidence in that case was relevant to contest that defense). Even the
Hassett Court reached its decision through operation of this rule, as it found the

evidence relevant to rebut the defendant's claim that he touched the victim as alleged
"only for examination and resuscitation purposes."

Hassett, 124 Idaho at 361

(emphasis added). Therefore, it is Roach, and not Hassett, which governs the issue in
Mr. Ortega's case.
Applying the rule from Roach to this case, the propensity testimony was not
relevant to show absence of mistake or accident because Mr. Ortega was not arguing
that he mistakenly or accidentally touched A.O. on the day in question.
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Rather, he

that he did not touch A.O. as alleged. For example, he asserted that A.O.'s
arm broke when A.

landed on it as he fell from the car.

As a result, absence of

mistake does not justify the admission of the propensity evidence in this case. Since
the propensity evidence was not relevant for a justified purpose, its admission was
erroneous. As such, this Court should vacate the conviction and remand this case for a
new trial.

D.

Even If The Propensity Evidence Is Relevant, The Prejudicial Nature Of That
Evidence Substantially Outweighs The Minimal Probative Value Such Evidence
Might Have
The State misunderstands Mr.

argument under the second prong of the

404(b) analysis (weighing the evidence

I.R.E. 403).

The State apparently

believes that Mr. Ortega is arguing that all 404(b) witnesses must also be eyewitnesses
to the event in question for their testimony to

admissible. (Resp. Br., p.i

) That is

not Mr. Ortega's position.
Rather, he contended that because the testimony in question did not speak to
any fact of consequence, the propensity evidence had very little probative value.
(App. Br., pp.9-11.) Given the defense raised in this case - that Mr. Ortega did not
touch A.O. as alleged - the only fact of consequence is whether Mr. Ortega did touch
A.O. as alleged. Since none of the challenged testimony speaks to that fact, but rather,
speaks to Mr. Ortega's intent had he touched A.O. as alleged (which is not, as
discussed supra, a fact of consequence in this case), that testimony has minimal
probative value in this case.

Thus, the inherent prejudicial effect of their propensity

evidence, see State v. Bingham, 124 Idaho 698, 701-02 (1993), substantially outweighs

11

the minimal probative value of that evidence.
it should not

was

such, even if the challenged testimony

been admitted under I.

403.

In addition, the State makes no argument that the testimony in question had any
additional probative value. (See generally Resp. Br.) Instead, it simply contends that,
the district court's assertion of probative value was sufficient. (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) To
that point, it asserts that the district court was relying on more than the mere temporal
proximity of the incidents in the testimony challenged, and the incident underlying the
criminal charge in this case. (Resp. Br., p.12.) It points to the district court's statement
that the incidents appear "close in manner" and
p.21, Ls.1 ~ 11l That statement

not change

a pattern. (See Tr., Vol. 1,
that the

court went on

to rule that the evidence was admissible because "It's close enough in time." (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.21, Ls.6-11.) In either case, because the testimony at issue is not probative to a fact
of consequence to the determination of the action, its probative value is still
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial nature of that testimony, and so, should still
have been excluded.

See, e.g., State v. Bingham, 124 Idaho 698, 701-02 (1993)

(finding that the district court erred by admitting minimally-probative propensity
evidence).
Furthermore, neither the district court nor the State explains what similarities
exist to establish the purported pattern. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that such a
generalized assertion of similarity is insufficient to justify admission of propensity
evidence.

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013).

Rather, there must be evidence

There is a typographical error in citing to this portion of the transcript in the Appellant's
Brief. (See App. Br., p.10 (citing to page 32, rather than page 21).) Mr. Ortega
apologizes for that mistake.
3
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"'beyond the bare fact' that the defendant has committed the same kind of misconduct
in the past," in order for such propensity evidence to be admissible Id. (specifically
assessing this requirement in the context of the "common scheme or plan" exception).
The Supreme Court explained: "'[t]he events must be linked by common characteristics
that go beyond showing mere propensity .... '"
Idaho 664, 668 (2010».

Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 148

"The mere fact that the charged and uncharged conduct is

similar does not by itself establish [relevance]." Id.

Rather, "evidence showing only

'generalized similarities' between charged and uncharged conduct . . . 'is more
accurately described as inadmissible evidence merely demonstrating the defendant's
predisposition for [committing the

conduct].'"

Id. (quoting Johnson, 1

Idaho

669.) Thus, to be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior misconduct must

show more than a superficial similarity (i.e., "It's close in time, its

in manner"

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.21, Ls.2-3» to the nature and details of the charged conduct. Therefore,
the district court's erroneous order admitting this propensity evidence should be
reversed.

E.

The State Has Not Met Its Burden To Demonstrate That The Error In Admitting
This Evidence Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
When there is objected to error, "the State shall have the burden of

demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). To meet that burden, the State must satisfy the harmless
error test established in Chapman v. California, which requires the State to prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such
evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."

13

Chapman v. California, 386

u

.18,

(1967); see also Perry, 150 Idaho

App. 2013). The State has only
harmless.

, State v. Day, 1

Idaho 476, 479

a superficial argument to that the error was

(Resp. Br., p.14 n.3.) That argument neither

authority nor actually

why the error did not contribute to the verdict rendered. As such, particularly
since the State bears the burden of proof in this regard, its failure to make a specific
argument means it has failed to meet that burden.

Compare State v. Almaraz, 154

Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) ("However the State never specifically argues that Hust's
identification did not 'contribute to the verdict obtained' as clearly required under
... Therefore, this Court finds that the

failed to meet

burden of proving

error is harmless.").
if the

made

sufficient argument to

harmlessness, it has not met the standard

forth by the

Notably, Melissa Rushing was an eyewitness to the events at

the question of
Court in Perry.
car, and she testified

based on her observations, she concluded that AO. had fallen from the car on his own.
She specifically testified that she saw a gentleman, who was Mr. Ortega, in the driver's
seat on a cell phone. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.420, L.22 - p.421 , L.4.) She looked up and saw that
AO. had fallen to the ground.

(Tr., Vo1.2, p.421 , Ls.5-7; Tr., Vo1.2, p.421 , LS.8-19

(explaining that she did not actually see AO. fall, but leapt to that conclusion given
everything else she saw).) She testified that, "I got down to the ground to assist the little
guy, I pushed the door, and the gentleman was coming around the very back of the
car." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.422, Ls.3-7 (emphasis added).) It is difficult to see how Mr. Ortega

could have been in a position to grab AO.'s arm in a way that would cause the injuries
observed if he had to come around the car to reach AO.'s side. Since Ms. Rushing, as
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only other eyewitness to that event, corroborated Mr. Ortega's story, there is
definitely a reasonable possibility that the propensity evidence contributed to the jury's
decision to convict Mr. Ortega on Count I. even though the evidence demonstrates he
was not even in a position to grab A.O.'s arm in a way that would cause the injuries
observed at the time those injuries were sustained. Therefore, even if the State has
made a sufficient argument that does not forfeit the question of harmlessness, it has
failed to meet its burden in light of the evidence presented. As such, the judgment of
conviction should be vacated.

II.

Parenting Efforts
The State makes two contentions regarding whether the district court should
have given the reasonable parenting efforts instruction. Neither argument contends that
the statement from State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851, 855 (Ct. App. 1989). which
constituted the requested instruction is not an accurate statement of the law.

(See

generally Resp. Br., pp.13-17.) Rather, the State argues that Peters, as well as the two
related cases, State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370 (2002), and State v. Halbesleben, 139
Idaho 165 (Ct. App. 2003), do not address the same issue presented in this case, and
so does not indicate that the requested instruction should have been given. 4 (Resp.

In this regard, Mr. Ortega believes there is a typographical error in the Respondent's
brief. The State asserts that "Ortega nevertheless argues that even if the language
from Peters is dicta, it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Young ...
." (Resp. Br., p.16 (emphasis added).) Mr. Ortega is arguing that Young demonstrates
the language in Peters is an accurate statement of the law, even if it were articulated in
dicta in the Peters decision. (See App. Br., pp.11-16.) As such, he is arguing that
Peters is consistent with Young. And if Mr. Ortega is mistaken, and the State is actually
4
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Br., pp.13-17.) It

on the fact that there is not a pattern jury instruction to this
,pp.14-15.) Neither of the State's arguments demonstrates that the

failure to give the requested instruction was appropriate.
Most importantly, "[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction where 'there is a
reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would support' the theory."
State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 247-48 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Eastman, 1

Idaho 87, 90 (1992)).

Furthermore, both the Supreme Court and the

Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized that there is a viable theory for a defense to an
allegation of child abuse
is not to punish

on

parenting efforts: "'The purpose of the
in

that are reviewed in hindsight. . . .

custodians of children may

subjected to criminal penalties for good faith

decisions that turn out poorly-innocent mistakes in judgment.'"
Idaho

Halbesleben, 139

169-70 (quoting Young, 138 Idaho at 373)5; see also State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho

163,170 (1985), overruled on other grounds by State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721,722-23
(1992).

Since a reasonable view of the evidence would support a theory that

Mr. Ortega was engaged in reasonable parenting efforts in helping A.O. learn to get out
of a car on his own, as well as in addressing the propensity evidence regarding his
parenting efforts with A.O., Mr. Ortega was entitled to the requested instruction.

arguing that Peters is inconsistent with Young, that assertion is meritless, since both
decisions recognize that parents may make reasonable and good faith decisions
regarding the parenting of their children and not be subject to criminal penalties for
those decisions. Young, 138 Idaho at 373; Peters, 116 Idaho at 855.
5 The State asserts that, because Young and Halbesleben were both considering the
different (though related) question of how to properly instruct the jury regarding the
definition of "willful" in child abuse cases, they are not relevant to this case. (See Resp.
Br., pp.16-17.) It is wrong, since both decisions discuss the viable theory of defense
that is applicable in this case.
16

The fact that there is not a pattern instruction is irrelevant. After all, the pattern
instructions thernselves address this very question:
[J]udges and lawyers should note that these instructions cannot possibly
cover all of the legal issues on which a jury may need guidance in a
particular case. Matters of law not covered by these instructions ... may
arise in a criminal case. .. A trial judge should remain vigilant in
observing the duty set forth in Idaho Code §19-2132: "In charging the
jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their
information. "
Idaho Supreme Court website, "Introduction and General Directions for Use,"
http://isc.idaho.gov/problem-solving/criminal-jury-instructions (last visited April 9, 2014).
As a result, where there is a better or more clear statement of the law, the district court
should give
instruction.

instruction, even though there may not be an associated pattern

v. Ruel, 141 Idaho 600, 602 (Ct. App. 2005).

the decisions in

Young and Halbesleben indicate, the pattern instructions have not always been clear
when it comes to child abuse cases.

Therefore, since the language in Peters

constitutes an accurate statement of the law, and there was a reasonable view of the
evidence supporting the viable theory it underscored, Mr. Ortega was entitled to that
instruction.

As such, because the jury was improperly instructed, Mr. Ortega's

conviction should be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Mr.

respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the

district court's decisions to allow the presentation of the propensity evidence and to not
give the reasonable parenting jury instruction, and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 1

day of April, 201

B AN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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